[CONSTITUTION as of 1949]

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q) labour legislation;
r) Legislation concerning marriage and the family;
s) Direction of public health;
t) Direction of social maintenance;
u) Direction of elementary, secondary and higher education;
v) Direction of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of the Russian SFSR, and administration of the cultural, educational and scientific organizations and institutions of all-Republican importance;
w) Direction and organization of physical culture and sports;
x) Organization of the judicial organs of the Russian SFSR;
y) Granting the rights of citizenship of the Russian SFSR;
z) Amnesty and pardon of citizens convicted by judicial organs of the Russian SFSR;
aa) Establishment of the representation of the Russian SFSR in international relations;
bb) Organization of the military formations of the Russian SFSR.

635 Art. 20. Every Autonomous Republic has its Constitution which takes into account its peculiar features and is constructed in full agreement with the Constitutions of the Russian SFSR and of the USSR.

Art. 21. The laws of the Russian SFSR have the same force within the territory of every Autonomous Republic. In the event of discrepancy between the law of the Autonomous Republic and a law of the Russian SFSR, the law of the Russian SFSR prevails.

Chapter III. The Higher Organs of State Power of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic

● 646 Art. 22. The highest organ of state power in the Russian SFSR is the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

[642] Art. 23. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR exercises all rights vested in the Russian SFSR in accordance with Articles 13 and 19 of the Constitution of the Russian SFSR, insofar as they do not, by virtue of the Constitution, come within the jurisdiction of organs of the Russian SFSR that are accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, that is, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, the Council of Ministers of the Russian SFSR, and the Ministries of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 24. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR is the sole legislative organ of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 25. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR is elected for a term of four years by the citizens of the Russian SFSR voting by election districts on the basis of one deputy for every 150,000 of the population.

Art. 26. A law is considered adopted if passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR by a simple majority vote.

Art. 27. Laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR are published over the signatures of the President and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 28. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR elects a Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and eight Vice-Chairmen.

1 [Cf. p.p. 2, 3-4--Analyst]

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[642] Art. 29. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR presides at the sittings of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR and has charge of the conduct of its business and proceedings.

[643] Art. 30. Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR twice a year.

Extraordinary sessions are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR at its discretion or on the demand of one-third of the deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 31. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR consisting of a President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, twelve Vice-Presidents, according to the number of the Autonomous Republics, the Secretary of the Presidium and 13 Members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 32. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR for all its activities.

Art. 33. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR:

a) Convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR;
b) Issues decrees;
c) Gives interpretations of the laws of the Russian SFSR;
d) Conducts nation-wide polls (referendums);
e) Annuls decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the

[645] Russian SFSR, the Councils of Ministers of the Autonomous Republics, the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of territories and regions and the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Autonomous Regions, if they do not conform to the law;

f) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, releases and appoints Ministers of the Russian SFSR, on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian SFSR, subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR;
g) Institutes titles of honour of the Russian SFSR;
h) Confers titles of honour of the Russian SFSR;
i) Exercises the right of pardoning citizens convicted by judicial organs of the Russian SFSR;
j) Appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of the Russian SFSR to foreign states;
k) Receives the letters of credence and recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by foreign states.

Art. 34. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR elects a Credentials Committee to verify the credentials of the members of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

On the report of the Credentials Committee, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR decides whether to recognize the credentials of deputies or to annul their election.

Art. 35. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, when it deems necessary, appoints commissions of investigation and audit on any matter.

It is the duty of all institutions and officials to comply with the demands of such commissions and to submit to them all necessary materials and documents.

5: Amer. Russ. Inst. (no date) 1950 RF1 Great Russia RF1

[CONSTITUTION as of 1949]

646 Art. 36. A member of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR may not be prosecuted or arrested without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, or, when the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR is not in session, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

643 644 [644] Art. 37. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR orders new elections to be held within a period not exceeding two months from the date of expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 38. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR retains its powers until the newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR shall have formed a new presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 39. The newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR is convened by the outgoing Presidum of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR not later than three months after the elections.

645 [645] Art. 40. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR appoints the Government of the Russian SFSR, namely, the Council of Ministers of the Russian SFSR.

Chapter IV. The Organs of State Administration of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic

Art. 41. The highest executive and administrative organ of state power of the Russian SFSR is the Council of Ministers of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 42. The Council of Ministers of the Russian SFSR is responsible and accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, or, in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 43. The Council of Ministers of the Russian SFSR issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the USSR and the Russian SFSR, and of the decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and verifies their execution.

Art. 44. Decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Russian SFSR are binding throughout the territory of the Russian SFSR.

Art. 45. The Council of Ministers of the Russian SFSR:

a) Coordinates and directs the work of the Ministries of the Russian SFSR and of other institutions under its jurisdiction; coordinates and verifies the work of the authorized representatives of the all-Union Ministries;

b) Adopts measures to carry out the national-economic plan;

c) Adopts measures to fulfil the state and local budgets of the Russian SFSR;

d) Adopts measures for the maintenance of public order, for the protection of the interests of the state, and for the safeguarding of the rights of citizens;

e) Directs and verifies the work of the Councils of Ministers of the Autonomous Republics, directs and verifies the work of the Executive Committees of territorial and regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies;

[Constitution as of 1949]

633 Art. 100. The Departments of the Executive Committees of the city Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the respective city Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies or directly to the corresponding Departments of the territorial and regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 101. The Departments of the Executive Committees of the city Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Moscow and Leningrad are subordinate in their activities both to the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Moscow and Leningrad and their Executive Committees as well as to the corresponding Ministry of the Russian SFSR directly.

634 Art. 102. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies of National Areas and their Executive Committees exercise in the territory of their Areas the rights and duties conferred on them by the "Statute of National Areas" and likewise by the decisions of the corresponding territorial or regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

"The Statute of National Areas" is established by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR.

Chapter IX. The Budget of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic

652 Art. 103. The state budget of the Russian SFSR is drawn up by the Council
646 of Ministers of the Russian SFSR and submitted by it to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR for its approval.

Upon its approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR the state budget of the Russian SFSR is published for general information.

Art. 104. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR elects a Budget Commission, which reports its conclusions on the state budget of the Russian SFSR to the Supreme Soviet.

Art. 105. The report on the fulfilment of the state budget of the Russian SFSR is approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR and published for general information.

652 Art. 106. The budgets of Autonomous Republics, and the local budgets of
631 territories, regions, Autonomous Regions, National and Administrative Areas, district, city and village Soviets include the revenues from the local economy, deductions from the state revenues collected within their territories and likewise receipts from local taxes and imposts in amounts fixed by the laws of the USSR and of the Russian SFSR.

Chapter X. The Courts and the Procurator's Office.

692 Art. 107. In the Russian SFSR justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the Russian SFSR, the Supreme Courts of the Autonomous Republics, Territorial and Regional Courts, the Courts of the Autonomous Regions, the Courts of National Areas, the Courts of Administrative Areas, the Special Courts of the USSR established by decision of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the People's Courts.

693 Art. 108. In all Courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

III

The atmosphere of despotism, servility, fear and awe which developed under this system of total regimentation and dependency left an imprint on the habits and the attitudes of the people and had some influence on the shaping of their values and of their views of life. In conditions of complete dependency and domineering-subservience relationships, self-concern, destructive aggressiveness, as well as fatalistic resignation, are likely to thrive, not personal and social responsibility, moral obligations or group solidarity.

This trend of events meant also increasing social restlessness and political instability which in turn favored the rise to leadership of ruthless power-seekers and psychopaths. Lack of limitation on the personal power of the Czar, dissensions among the nobility and want of responsibility and of emotional balance in the person of the Czar led often to extreme excesses in Czar's rule.[11] All the attempts of the boyars to transform the Boyarskaya Duma into a legislative body were unsuccessful. Since the end of the seventeenth century even the *Zemski Sabor*, the consultative body of representatives of all classes, ceased to be convoked.

Only when the throne became vacant and the omnipotent Czar was gone did this nobility sometimes attempt to squeeze out promises and pledges from the pretenders to the throne. But, even then the remnants of the old boyar class and the new service nobility clashed over the question of control. Hence as soon as the new monarch was installed he did not have any difficulty in establishing his unlimited control and in proceeding to rule arbitrarily in face of a divided dvorianstvo.

The Czar could do anything he pleased with the nobles, including personal chastisement. They were treated as minors by the Czar and trained in blind and unconditional obedience. In the Czar's presence they observed dead silence. Anything that came from his hand, even the most degrading treatment, was to be received with resignation or even regarded as a sign of distinction. At the same time, however, while the nobles were exposed to all kinds of threat, terror and indignities on the part

7 [i.e. Czardom by end of 17th century.. Analyst]

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RF1 Great Russia RF1

The speeches of the peasants' deputies in the second Duma unmistakably show that the peasants considered that the land belonged to them and to nobody else and that the times of degrading oppression were over. They declared themselves in favor of the free distribution of all the land that was in the possession of the nobility, the Church, and the state:

> We are talking of land these days as of nothing else. We are told it is a sacred, inviolate possession. I think if the people want it, there can be no inviolateness about it. Gentlemen of the nobility! You think we have forgotten the time when you used us as stakes in playing at cards and exchanged us for dogs! We know we were your sacred inviolate property. But the land has been stolen from us. The peasants who have sent me here have said that the land is ours! We have come here not to buy but to take it.[14]

Because of such beliefs and ideas which were intensified by systematic revolutionary propaganda of professional conspirators and agitators, any rumors concerning the land always found a ready response among the peasantry. It is for the same reason that often only a vague rumor about a government land decree was sufficient to convince the peasants that the land was given back to them by the Czar, but that it was the lesser government officials, bribed by the landlords, who kept the land out of their hands. Such land-hungry peasants, already inclined to rebel against age-long and humiliating dependency, were ready to take the law into their own hands, to seize the manorial lands, to loot the estates and to kill the landlords whenever they felt that the power of the existing authorities was crumbling.

The professional conspirators among the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia took full advantage of such inclinations. Their revolutionary plans were especially favored by the growing differentiation in the Russian villages. In the first decade of the twentieth century economic and social differentiation in the Great-Russian village was already well advanced. It was favored by a series of government measures (Stolypin reforms)[15] which were aimed at developing a stratum of independent and prosperous peasantry and destroying the system of communal landholding. As a result of such measures the Great-Russian village became by the first decade of this century composed of a number

6: Tomasic E-4 (1947-1948) 1953 RFI Great Russia RFI

self. And after the army which Czar Nicholas personally commanded in 1917 had suffered defeats at the hands of the enemies, and the chiefs of the armed forces suggested to the Czar that he should resign, he realized that his prestige had fallen and his authority gone. As out of spite he abdicated not only for himself but for his heirs as well. And as it has already happened in Russia's past, when the central authority suffered defeat and loss of prestige, all seething internal forces of revolt, relieved of the controls that kept them under check, burst out in violent eruptions. In such circumstances everybody deserted the Czar, even the Orthodox Church:

> Even the Orthodox Clergy, that class that had been an integrated part of the Czarist system deserted the Czar in the hour of his doom. Showing as much lack of a sense of proportion as the other classes of Russian society the official hierarchy went as far as to pass a decision according to which all lines containing the word "king" in the Psalms of Dayid were to be deleted.[13]

III

All these circumstances, combined with the extreme factionalism within the intelligentsia, greatly facilitated the seizure of the power by the Bolsheviks. All the four national *Dumas* which were convoked since 1905 were composed predominantly of the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia. The same situation existed in the leading circles of all political parties.[14] But in each party, self-centeredness and lust for power led the intelligentsia into constant bickering among themselves and neverending fighting for leadership, a situation that manifested itself in numerous party splits.

It was only in the Bolshevik Party that the Party's Central Committee was well disciplined and unified under one leader who had absolutist and dictatorial powers. This sitution spared the Party too many splits. This Bolshevik system favored the reduction of Party leadership to a rather small number of intellectuals who relied on the semi-intelligentsia and industrial workers in local Party work. It was this dictatorial, centralistic and "aristocratic" organization of the Bolsheviks, as well as the extreme ruthlessness and aggressiveness of its leaders and fanat-